Greg Detre
16/10/01
propositional attitudes � beliefs/hopes/desires
mental attitude to a thing/content/idea
intentionality � reference to something outside that person
desires + hopes: not truth, but fulfilment conditions
intentionality � match with the world
Searle � intentionality = irreducible, bare fact, bound up with consciousness
information-carrying states, like rings in a tree � law-like connectoin between the state + the information
causal relation of idea � functional role
how can sounds + sentences too have intentionality?
derived
Grice theory of meaning � explaining sentences in terms of the mental states of the speakers
reducing the semantic to the psychological
but, the meaning also seems to be in the opposite direction, in the words
intentionality \ is not sufficient
is it necessary?
no, because of non-intentional mental states, e.g. sensations
mentality ↔ consciousness?
but what is it? conscious states: those we are aware of�
do dispositional states have a phenomenal character, like pain/emotion?
potential consciousness �/span> immediate non-inferential access
unconscious/repressed beliefs/desires etc.
folk psychology � set of laws + rules of thumb for predicting behaviour by ascribing beliefs + desires
R Gregory vs occurrent/dispositional states
does the flawed access to mental state make a difference??? e.g. proprioception
maybe mentality needs to be categorised, and can't be talked about as a unitary concept???
a fortiori vs a priori in rationality???
mental states as high-level representations, i.e. abstracted intentionality???